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[Abstract] 
This report seeks to explore the significance of Afghan traders for Tajikistan’s economy, 
documenting the specific commodities Afghans bring to and export from Tajikistan, 
and the routes along which these move. It also aims to document the key problems 
and barriers that Afghan traders living and working in Tajikistan see as most affecting 
their lives, and note some of the opportunities they envision for future trade projects.

Introduction 
This paper seeks to explore the significance of Afghan traders for Ta-
jikistan’s economy, documenting the specific commodities and prod-
ucts that Afghans bring to and export from Tajikistan, and the routes 
along which these move. It also aims to document the key problems 
and barriers that Afghan traders living and working in Tajikistan see 
as most affecting their lives, and note some of the opportunities they 
envision for future trade projects.   
 
The paper is based primarily on over 20 conversations and interviews 
conducted with Afghan traders in Dushanbe, Khujand, and the Nizh-
niy Pyanj border post and surrounding villages in April 2010. These 
conversations were held mostly in the shops and offices of Afghan 
traders in the key markets in which they work, notably the ‘Afghan 
bazaar’ in Khujand, and the Satbarg, Farawan, Korvon, and Zilioni 
markets in Dushanbe. The interviews and research conducted in Pyanj 
were  carried out with the assistance of mobile Afghan trader from 
Kunduz who I have known since 2005 and who was on a visit to Taji-
kistan in connection with his cement businesses during my fieldwork 
there; that research also involved talking with this man’s Tajik busi-
ness partners (sharik) in their village farm.  
 
The paper also builds on and is informed by my longer-term research 
since 2005 on the lives of Afghan traders in Tajikistan and Afghani-
stan.1 The project aims to assess the agency of these people in forging 
new ties of trust across the boundary that divides Afghanistan from 
the post-Soviet world, as well as assessing their modes of experienc-
ing and reflecting upon the complex and divided world they inhabit as 
they move through it. Over the course of research visits to Afghani-
stan and Tajikistan in March 2008, December-January 2008/09, 
March-April 2009, August-September 2009, December-January 
2009/10, I have established long-term relations with Afghan traders 
and their Tajik partners.  
 
Methodologically, I have sought to explore these men’s life as mobile 
traders in the different locations to which they travel, tracing their 
movements between Tajikistan and a wide variety of locations in Af-
ghanistan and Pakistan, and staying as well as moving with them in 
these different locations. My work has included stays in Mazar-i Sha-
rif with traders involved in the movement of commodities into both 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, with traders in Kunduz who I came to 
know as the joint owners of petrol pumps and who are now shopkeep-
ers in small towns in Tajikistan, and with others whom I first met as 
gemstone dealers in the north eastern Afghanistan-Tajikistan border 
                                                 
1  The project has received generous funding from the British Academy, the Nuffield Foun-
dation, the Carey Trust, the University of Cambridge, Trinity College and SOAS.  
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post of Ishkasheim. Over the past five years I have observed important 
changes in these men’s trading profiles: after the opening of the bor-
der brindge at Sher Khan Bandar many of my informants became in-
volved in the transport  and sale of cement to Tajikistan, often partners 
in companies (shirkat) that now employ 60 labourers to load and un-
load their trucks of cement per day, as well as Tajik and Afghan truck 
drivers.   
The Traders 
Afghan traders active in bringing goods to and selling commodities 
within Tajikistan hail from a very wide range of social backgrounds, 
conduct a diverse range of economic activities in Tajikistan at differ-
ent scales, and inhabit varying legal categories in Tajikistan. The 
markers of difference amongst Afghan traders are all related to one 
another, and help to explain their varying activities as traders in the 
country.  
 
In terms of regional and ethnic affiliation, Afghan traders working in 
Tajikistan hail from a very diverse range of localities and as would be 
expected identify with different ethnic identity markers, although tho-
se from Dari and Turkic language groups appear to be better repre-
sented than Pashtun-speakers. The men whom I talked to for example 
identified themselves as being Turkmen, Uzbek, Hazara, and Tajik, 
and hailed from most of Afghanistan’s major cities (Kabul, Mazar-i 
Sharif, Herat, Kunduz). I also interviewed traders from Logar and 
Paghman, who were Pushtun yet spoke largely Dari, often having 
been born and brought up in Kabul. Importantly, many of the traders 
share living spaces and business interests with other people from Af-
ghanistan who identitfy with ethnic identity markers different from 
their own. 
 
The traders also inhabit a different range of legal categories in Tajiki-
stan. These legal categories help to determine in important ways their 
economic activities within and beyond Tajikistan. I can identify three 
major groups. Firstly, a small proportion of the traders (2 out of the 20 
interviewed) held Tajik citizenship. One of these men had lived in the 
country for over fifteen years; the other had been born in Dushanbe. 
These men’s trading operations very significant operations: one man 
imported subsistence food goods from Eastern Europe and Turkey; the 
other bought cement from Afghan traders coming from Kunduz, and 
was also employed by an important bank in Tajikistan. Traders with 
such a relatively stable position in Tajikistan are often the representa-
tives of major Iranian and Turkish food and soap producing compa-
nies. At the same time, and especially in Afghanistan, much critical 
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comment circulates about the type of agreements that such men might 
have made with Central Asian governments to secure their citizenship.  
 
Secondly, a significant number of the traders I interviewed are refu-
gees in Tajikistan. They hold refugee documents (kart-i gurizondah) 
in the country having registered with the UNHRC. These men often 
live with their families, having come to Tajikistan in the late 1990s. 
Some were given travel documents to resettle in Canada between 1999 
and 2004 yet made the decision to stay in Tajikistan because of their 
large families and/or good businesses. Others have moved to Tajiki-
stan more recently, after having faced problems of various types in 
Afghanistan, and seek to travel onwards to the West. One man I met, 
for example, was kidnapped in Mazaar and compelled to make a pay-
ment of over $60,000 to the kidnap gang; he was also made to promise 
to pay the gang a further $120,000 after they had released him. In-
stead, he sold the goods he owned in Mazaar (mobile telephones) and 
moved with his family to Tajikistan, where he located himself in the 
northern city of Khujand (police harassment being reported to be less 
there) and launched a small family business in the sale of Indian jew-
ellery imported by Afghan merchants. He now runs five market stalls 
in different locations across the city: two of which are run by his 
young sons who have as yet been unable to attend school in Tajikistan 
and a further two by his sister’s brother and her son. He was also joi-
ned in Khujand by his sister after her husband was killed in a suicide 
bomb outside the Indian embassy in Kabul: this woman’s young sons 
work as porters and trolley pushers in the bazaar. Another trader I in-
terviewed in Dushanbe had left Afghanistan two years previously be-
cause his brother fights with the British Army in Helmand, the Taliban 
are active in his village and insisted that he order his brother to return 
home or they would kill him, so he left with his family to Dushanbe.  
 
Traders from Afghanistan who live in the country as refugees and who 
hold refugee cards are mostly involved in the purchasing of goods 
from more mobile Afghan merchants, which they then distribute and 
sell at varying scales – sometimes on a wholesale basis (such as flour 
in Dushanbe’s bazaars), and others, like those discussed above, in 
more local bazaars.   
 
The third category of Afghan traders includes those who travel fre-
quently between Afghanistan and Tajikistan and hold work or mehnat 
visas. These visas are relatively easily if expensively obtained in Af-
ghanistan (at the embassy in Kabul, and the consulates in Kunduz and 
Mazar); they may then be extended on a 6 month or sometimes even 
yearly basis in Dushanbe. These traders are often part of medium-
sized companies registered in Afghanistan, which have a varying 
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number of partners (often between two and five partners).2 Sometimes 
these companies are registered in Tajikistan, although, as I explore in 
greater detail below, undertaking the registration process is considered 
difficult by all the men I spoke to, and so many traders have now cea-
sed to register their companies in the country.  
 
Finally, in addition to such medium-sized trading operations I am 
aware of one major international company that might be said to fit a 
much more global and dispersed model of operations than the types of 
trade discussed above. The Alkozay Group of Companies is a multina-
tional Afghan operation, with its headquarters is in Jebel Ali (UAE), 
where it refines and packages a wide variety of teas in loose and bag 
form for export across the world (all of the Central Asian states, Rus-
sia, the Caucauas, Europe and Canada). The company has also laun-
ched a cooking oil factory in Turkey, is involved in the hotel and resi-
dential sector in Afghanistan, and also plays a major role in the import 
of fuel to Afghanistan across the border at Termez. The company 
made its initial money by importing Korean-made cigarettes to Cen-
tral Asian states shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union: the pro-
fits from this business allowed it to diversify to the extent that it has 
today. It is a very visible feature of the trading landscape in Tajikistan, 
advertising its products widely and aggressively across the country.  
 
This section has illustrated the complexity and diversity of the trading 
structures and modes of trade deployed and created by Afghans in Ta-
jikistan. Almost all of the traders introduced above may be described 
as ‘networked traders’ with a myriad of connections across Central 
Asia, Turkey, South Asia, Europe and even South East Asia. Yet the 
nature of the networks they are plugged into vary in significant ways, 
and this diversity, combined with their ability to adapt to changing 
political and economic conditions, is the basis of their success in trad-
ing ventures, but also the suspicion and sometimes hostility with 
which Afghans living in Tajikistan are viewed by host societies. Af-
ghanistan, its trading routes, and major bazaars and cities are critical 
to the economic lives and activities of those traders who are able to 
travel between Afghanistan and Tajikistan. At the same time, as I ex-
plore in the following sections, many others use their connections with 
Afghans distributed across a wide range of other places to trade, yet 
bypass their products away from Afghanistan’s unstable cities and un-
safe routes. The life histories of some of these people, indeed, indicate 
that they have traded in goods across Central Asia, including Uzbeki-
stan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and often also Russia. My findings 
also suggest that for some of these Afghans movement between extra-
Afghanistan locales is more important to their trading activities than 
                                                 
2  On the structure and of such medium-size Afghan trading companies see Lister and 
Brown 2004.  
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those involving Afghanistan. I interviewed, for example, three traders 
in Dushanbe who had come to the city from Turkmenistan in July 
2009. They had lived in the town of Charju (now Turkmenabat), and 
had traded across the Uzbekistan-Turkmenistan border in cotton oil. 
These men had good businesses in Turkmenistan, where they had 
married local women and with them established families. Yet they left 
the country because the government of Turkmenistan made their trad-
ing and family lives ‘difficult’, above all through imposing restrictions 
on their ability to own property and conduct business, as well as by 
constantly threatening them with deportation. Their lives and contin-
ued trading activities in Tajikistan suggest the emergence of a form of 
Afghan trading practice and even identity that is not merely ‘mobile’ 
and ‘networked’ but, rather, comparable to the emergence of other en-
trepreneurial trading minority communities elsewhere in the world.3 
Thus, whilst calls to profit from Afghanistan’s location as a key ‘tran-
sit route’ between Central and South Asia might have political traction 
at an elite or high level, then, the life and economic strategies of some 
of Afghan traders depend as much on bypassing the homeland as prof-
iting from new routes through it.  
The Commodities 
Afghan traders in Dushanbe are involved in the import and export of a 
very wide range of commodities, documented and analysed as fol-
lows: 
 
1. Fruit and Vegetables: There is a large market for winter fruit in 
Tajikistan. The opening of the Sher Khan Bandar Bridge has been 
central to facilitating the import to the country by Afghans of Pa-
kistani tangerines. Traders are involved in transporting tangerines 
to Tajikistan, their sale in Dushanbe’s bazaars, and their distribu-
tion across the country: the recent opening of a bazaar at the depar-
ture point for transport heading towards the Gorno-Badakshan re-
gion, for instance, is now a major centre of Afghans selling tange-
rines to Pamiri shopkeepers. Afghan involvement in the trade of 
tangerines is having other spinoffs for Afghan businesses in the 
city, most especially the opening of an Afghan-owned luxury juice 
bar in the city centre. 
 
The other two main vegetables that are traded by Afghans are early 
season tomatoes (March-April) from Afghanistan, and potatoes 
                                                 
3  In terms of identity formations, one of the characterising features of such communities is 
not only their complex relationship to host societies, but also their highly ambiguous rela-
tionship to ‘the homeland’ as both ‘not a place for life’ (as one young man from Mazar 
put it to me) and somewhere that’s significance pales in comparison to the smart Toyota 
cars they might drive up and down Dushanbe’s streets (as a man from Samaangan who 
five minutes previously told me he had no intention of ever returning to Afghanistan told 
me). 
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from Pakistan, especially the red variety favoured in Tajik kitchens. 
In addition, there is also some early season import of watermelons 
and husk melons, and in autumn a comparatively small trade in 
pomegranates from the southern city of Kandahar.  Other items im-
ported to Tajikistan from Afghanistan include green chillies, espe-
cially in the winter. Given the seasonality of all of these commodi-
ties, most Tajikistan-based traders are involved in the movement of 
other commodities during the tangerine ‘off season’, whilst a large 
number of traders who come to the city from Kabul to trade in 
tangerines in the winter months return to Kabul at the end of March 
to recommence their role in importing cement to Afghanistan and 
Tajikistan from Pakistan. For others, however, the summer months 
mean extended periods of being ‘out of work’ and having insuffi-
cient creditto finance further trade. The only vegetable that I have 
heard of being imported to Afghanistan from Tajikistan is lemons 
in the autumn months.4  
 
2. Subsistence Food Items: Afghan traders are critical to the impor-
tation to Tajikistan of subsistence food items. I was also told that 
the significance of Afghans to this sector has decreased in recent 
years: one trader, originally from Samangan, said that when he had 
come to Tajikistan in 1997, during the country’s civil war, Afghans 
were responsible for the import of 90% of the country’s basic food 
items, and that they continued to import up to 60% of such pro-
ducts today. Most importantly, Afghans are involved in the import 
of Kazakh wheat, which they also transport to flour mills in Taji-
kistan, and then sell and distribute in both wholesale and smaller 
scales to consumers in Tajikistan. At the end of the 1990s, I was 
told, Afghans had imported some Pakistani wheat to the country, 
yet the wheat was very dark in colour and not liked by Tajiks, 
meaning there is no market for Pakistani wheat to this day.  
 
I also interviewed two Afghan traders who were involved in the 
import to and sale in Tajikistan of Chinese rice, which is consumed 
largely by Tajiks at weddings and other collective events in the 
form of osh or plov. Smaller amounts of Pakistani and Afghan rice 
are also imported by Afghans to Tajikistan, although, an Afghan 
shopkeeper in Dushanbe told me, this is mostly consumed by Af-
ghans, Iranians and Pakistanis living in Dushanbe, rather than 
being an important feature in all of Tajikistan’s markets (I was 
unable to find Pakistani or Afghan rice in the bazaars of Khujand or 
Kulob from example, although have seen it for sale in Khorog whe-
re Tajiki traders buy it from Afghans at the ‘Afghan border ba-
                                                 
4  Afghans are also involved in the import to Tajikistan of vegetable items from elsewhere 
in Central Asia. On the Shahristan mountain pass between Khujand and Dushanbe, for 
example, I interviewed one Afghan trader who was in partnership with a Tajik trader and 
and importing a container load of white Uzbek onions to Dushanbe.  
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zaars’ (bazaar-e mushtaraq)). I was not able to find evidence of 
Afghan involvement in the import or making of pasta, the cheapest 
form of carbohydrate, in Tajikistan, although they do buy pasta to 
sell in their retail outlets, and an Afghan businessmen in Tashkent 
does own a factory making pasta in Taskhent.  
 
In addition to key staple carbohydrates, Afghans also import large 
quantities of another basic food commodity in Tajikistan: vegetable 
cooking oil to the country. Cooking oil is mostly imported from 
three countries: Turkey (vegetable oil), Turkmenistan (cotton oil) 
and Malaysia (vegetable oil), and, as noted above, Afghan compa-
nies are now also involved in the production of vegetable oil in 
Turkey (e.g. Alkozay) and the UAE (e.g. Momin). Afghan traders, 
thus, are successful in this trade because of their connections to Af-
ghan business associated in locations outside of Central Asia. Im-
portantly, moreover, these trade networks point towards the ways 
in which the importance of Afghans to the region economy lies not 
merely in the movement of goods (i.e. as a middleman minority), 
but also in the domain of small-scale industrial production. In addi-
tion to cooking oil, I have also been told of Afghans with bread and 
biscuit factories in southern Kazakhstan near the border with Uz-
bekistan. The final basic food item imported by Afghans to Taji-
kistan is granulated sugar, imported from Poland, and again ship-
ped by Afghan traders based in Poland and Austria.  
 
Afghans are also involved in the import of more luxury consum-
ables from Afghanistan, and, again, there is also a significant pro-
duction dimension to these trades. Most notably, Coca Cola made 
in the Afghan factory at Bagram is now said to have ‘flooded’ the 
market by Tajik importers of soft drinks. Some Tajik-made vodka 
is also taken to Afghanistan, especially the brand Shohana, yet this 
is smuggled, and I have been unable to talk openly about this trade 
with the traders I interviewed. Finally, one Afghan trader I spoke to 
complemented his business in tangerines and chillies by importing 
flavoured milk made in Iran, which his brother in Tehran bought 
and transported to him.  
  
Taken together, then, food items forms one of the largest sector of 
Afghan trading activities in Tajikistan, underscoring their impor-
tance to the country’s economy, its relationship with international 
markets and countries, as well as their centrality to very import in-
ternal distribution mechanisms for markets within Tajikistan.  
 
3. Construction materials: The most economically significant prod-
uct moved across the Pyanj Bridge is cement. Most cement is 
bought by Afghan traders in the Pakistani Cherat cement factory, 
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transported to Kabul, repurchased by traders with offices at Sher 
Khan Bandar and then transported, sometimes by Tajik partners 
and sometimes by Afghans themselves, to Dushanbe and Qurghon 
Teppa.5 At the time of writing, in spite of the global economic re-
cession, traders were relatively upbeat about the cement business in 
Tajikistan: the country’s own cement is being entirely used in the 
building of the Roghun dam, meaning that significant quantities 
were required for private construction projects in the country. Some 
traders had imported cement made in the Afghan Pul-i Khumri fac-
tory, although said this had been unsuccessful as the bags were not 
durable enough to protect the cement on the road journey causing 
high levels of wastage.  
 
The cement business has had a very quick and noticeable effect on 
the border in Afghanistan and the lives of traders in Kunduz. One 
informant who I have known since 2005, for example, is a Panjshiri 
living in Kunduz who was previously in the precious stone busi-
ness: he bought rubies at the Afghan bazaar in Iskhashim and then 
transported to Kabul for sale to Sri Lankan merchants. Since the 
bridge opened at Sher Khan, however, he has not returned to Ish-
kashim, where, he jokes, his Tajik business partner is crying for 
him to return. Instead, his focus is on the cement business. During 
the summer and spring season his trading company (shirkat) jointly 
owned with another man from Kunduz is able to move between 7 
and 10 trucks of cement across the bridge to Tajikistan per day. He 
employs about fifty Afghan labourers a day to load and unload the 
trucks, and a further or fifteen or so men from Kunduz to act as se-
curity guards at his warehouse and office, where he originally ren-
ted land from the government, but has now bought private land, 
constructed a large office (where he now mostly lives even em-
ploying a cook), and store room. During the winter, as with other 
traders, he sends Pakistani red potatoes and mandarins to Taji-
kistan’s markets. As noted in the context of Afghanistan, the ce-
ment businesses is extremely competitive and the relations of those 
involved often highly conflictual: partnerships break with relative 
ease, and men with the capacity to launch major companies are wi-
dely accused of having made their money to enter the market 
through either the smuggling of heroin or corrupt practices within 
the state.  The other main construction item that crosses the border 
is in the direction of Afghanistan: Tajik- and sometimes Uzbek-
made seekh-i gul or steel poles made for house construction.    
 
4. Clothes and Jewellery:  Afghans also play a major role in the 
transport and sale in Tajikistan in the increasingly fashionable In-
                                                 
5  On the mechanics of the import-export of cement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, see 
Lister and Karaev 2004.  
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dian, Pakistan and Iranian clothes. These include especially cotton 
shalwar kamiz made in India and Pakistan (mostly for women but 
increasingly also for men, the male shalwar kamiz are increasingly 
worn in Tajikistan by men who have returned from the Hajj to 
Mecca), good quality veils (made in Iran), sheepskin coats (sewn in 
Istalif Afghanistan), as well as smaller quantities of suits, shirts, 
ties and other ‘western’ clothes (made in Turkey and Italy). Some 
traders bring these clothes by the container load, whilst many more 
on travelling to Tajikistan to visit relatives or do other business 
bring three or so bags in the cars in which they travel, and then sell 
these to Afghan refugees who run shops in Dushanbe’s Korvon ba-
zaar.  
 
Many of these clothing shops also sell relatively low priced Indian 
jewellery, which is also imported by Afghan traders. Some Chinese 
jewellery is also sold, which is largely brought into Tajikistan from 
Afghanistan, rather than China.  
 
5. Household items: A range of smaller Pakistani and Afghan-made 
goods are also imported into Tajikistan by Afghans, which are very 
important to people’s domestic lives in Tajikistan. These include, 
most importantly, Pakistan-made candles and matches which are 
especially important in the many regions of Tajikistan that have 
poor electricity supplies (the Dushanbe bazaar for transport  to the 
Pamirs is full of shops selling these items).  
 
An item that Afghans seem to have started importing to Tajikistan 
more recently is the deg-i bukhar, or Afghan-style pressure cooker, 
made in the cities of Jalalabad and Mazar-i Sharif. These pressure 
cookers are increasingly becoming a sought after commodity for 
Tajik women who recognise their benefits for speedily cooking 
cheaper cuts of meat. Traders involved in the import of these, often 
also transport, sell and distribute other metal items made in Paki-
stan’s Punjab province, especially lotas   (water pots with portable 
basins used far washing the hands of guests), tea pots and some 
conventional cooking pots.  
 
6. Soaps and Detergents: Afghans are major players in the import to 
Tajikistan of a variety of kinds of soaps, detergents, washing pow-
ders and bars of soap for washing clothes favoured by people living 
in villages and towns with poor supplies of water. These products 
are mostly made in Turkey, Iran and central Russia, although I 
spoke to one trader whom imported a brand of Shampoo (“Ham-
burg”) that was made in the Afghan city of Herat by a merchant ba-
sed in Germany. As is the case with basic food items, there is in-
deed evidence that Afghans are establishing soap and cosmetic in-
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dustries elsewhere: one brand of washing powder, “Pamir”, for ex-
ample, is made by an Afghan company based in Indonesia, whilst 
Afghans are also involved in the production of beauty creams in the 
UAE. Studies of such small-scale industrial activity in a wide range 
of settings deserves further exploration, not least for the insights it 
would afford into the choices being made by Afghans about good 
places to work. Not all of these ‘Afghan’ products are successful, 
however: one trader I spoke to said he had imported to both Taji-
kistan and Afghanistan a brand of washing soap made by an Af-
ghan trader in Central Russia, although the product had not been a 
success, and suffered from poor sales, which eventually forced him 
to bankrupt his company. Finally, Afghan traders with ties to Iran 
also often import high quality Iranian-made lavatory paper, as well 
as nappies. The extremely important role of Afghan traders as the 
importers and distributors of both multi-national and Iranian, Rus-
sian and Turkish brands, as well as themselves producers of hygie-
ne products is significant for what it reveals about their participa-
tion in the reconfiguration of regional understandings of gender, 
social responsibility and citizenship, but also because of the in-
sights it offers into the ways in which they have become ‘allied 
themselves to international public health goals through educational 
market campaigns and direct distribution franchises’ (Cross and 
Street 2010).  
 
7. Animal products: Turkmen and Uzbek-speaking traders from the 
North Western provinces of Afghanistan (Balkh, Maimana, and 
Shiberghan) in addition to being involved in the above trades are 
also active in more trading items that have been long important to 
their economic activities and indeed identities over the past cen-
tury: intestines (ruda) (which is imported to Mazar, made into sau-
sage casing, and then exported to Germany), wool (of varying 
qualities collected from the Katalon region, especially districts of 
Mominobod, Shurobod, Khovaling, and Qurghon and used in mak-
ing carpets in ‘factories’ owned by these men, their relatives or 
neighbours), skins (taken to Kabul and Karachi where it is proc-
esses into leather). On the course of my visit to the Pyanj Bridge I 
saw a lorry taking a load of skins to Afghanistan, although my in-
formants suggested that such a load would only pass the bridge re-
latively infrequently, once per month perhaps. The traders involved 
in these items themselves also say that whilst they used to be able 
to make a good living solely in this business they now have to di-
versify to other products because of the declining world market in 
Afghan carpets (even most Afghan traders prefer to decorate their 
officers with machine-made carpets than Afghans ones) and the in-
creasing use of synthetic materials for sausage casing. In addition, 
the barriers to this type of work are also high: Afghans report that 
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travel in Tajikistan’s non urban centres is difficult as they are fre-
quently stopped and made to pay bribes by the police; there have 
also been cases of such mobile Afghans being framed on drug 
smuggling charges.6 
 
8. Second Hand Clothing: The market in second hand clothing in 
Dushanbe appears to have emerged and expanded over the course 
of the past six months or so (I noticed a mushrooming of second 
hand clothes shops in central parts of the city on this visit), perhaps 
due to the economic recession. Most of these clothes are imported 
by Afghans who purchase them in Karachi and then bring them 
into Tajikistan. I visited the main warehouses and wholesale mar-
ket for second hand clothing, but was not able to find an Afghan 
trader willing to talk to me about the trade.  
 
9. Cigarettes: The cigarette trade is undoubtedly one of the most lu-
crative for Afghan traders in Tajikistan and other Central Asian 
states. Some of the most popular brands of cigarettes smoked in 
Tajikistan and elsewhere in the region are distributed by Afghan 
trading companies, most notably Korean-made Pine, Zest and Esse 
cigarettes by the Alkozay Company. There are also smaller brands 
of cigarettes made in India and then distributed by Afghan traders 
who own companies based in Dubai imported to the country, such 
as the M1 cigarette distributed by Donish General Trading Compa-
ny in Dubai. In addition to the legal and taxed movement of ciga-
rettes across the bridge at Sher Khan Bandar, there is also large 
scale trade in the smuggling of  cigarettes across the border both at 
Sher Khan Bandar and elsewhere along the border.  This is made 
possible by frequent and significant bribes to high offcials in the 
Tajik government, and on both  sides of the border. Afghans with 
their own brands of cigarettes often import their goods to Afghanis-
tan, offer them for sale, and leave smugglers to move them across 
the borders and benefit from the profits, although some are also 
said to pay significant sums of the profit made to major power hol-
ders within the Central Asian countries themselves.   
 
10. Used Cars. One trader I interviewed imported second hand cars 
from Germany (purchased by an Afghan trader) which were then 
disassembled, freighted to Tajikistan and reassembled by Afghan 
mechanics in Dushanbe. There is also some involvement in the 
movement of spare parts. Most of these vehicles are sold in Taji-
kistan, and the main vehicles to enter Afghanistan via this route 
                                                 
6  Difficulty of access to and travel within rural areas are, of course, a marked feature of the 
experience of trasing minorities in many different contexts and historical periods, see 
Reid 1998.  
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are luxury vehicles such as Range Rovers and Mercedes Jeeps, 
both highly sought after vehicles by Afghanistan’s elite.  
 
11. Skilled workers and artists:  Some Afghan construction compa-
nies, especially those involved in the building of blocks of flats in 
Kabul that follow Russian designs, employ Tajik engineers, de-
signers and workers, securing the working visas of these profes-
sionals that allow them to live and work in Kabul and elsewhere. 
Such work is seen as an attractive if dangerous in comparison to 
working in Russian cities. In addition, Afghan investors have been 
central to the expansion and internationalisation of the Tajik music 
industry: the UK-based Afghan company Qiyam Entertainment 
has organised concerts in Dushanbe, bringing Uzbek and Persian 
singers to Tajikistan from Uzbekistan, Iran, Afghanistan and the 
West, and it has also launched concerts involving singers from Ta-
jikistan for Iranian and Afghan diasporic audiences in the UK, Ca-
nada, and the USA.  As a result, Afghan entrepreneurs in the enter-
tainment industry are playing a critical role in the expansion of na-
tional subjectivities and the forging of larger scale regional identi-
ties.  
The Routes 
As the above section on commodities suggests, Afghan traders are in-
volved in the movement of goods along a wide range of different 
roots, many of which do not include Afghanistan itself.  
 
1. Peshawar-Kabul-Kunduz-Sher Khan Bandar-Qurghon Teppa-
Dushanbe:This route is used largely for the transport into Tajiki-
stan of cement and vegetables and into Afghanistan of the transport 
of metal poles for construction. Most traders hire Tajik transporta-
tion companies to move the cement from their warehouses at Sher 
Khan Bandar to destinations and warehouses in Tajikistan, 
although one trader based in Sher Khan I interviewed had recently 
bought a Mercedes truck for $66,000 in Kabul for which he had 
made the official documents to allow it to carry a full load to 
Dushanbe: he had also arranged for the Afghan driver to have a six 
month Tajikistan working visa and paid $200 for a flat in Dushanbe 
for him to stay at.  
 
2. Bandar Abbas-Transit Iran-Transit Turkmenistan-Aqinah 
(Afghanistan/Turkmenistan border)-Sher Khan Bandar-
Dushanbe: This route was used by one Afghan trader I inter-
viewed who was importing cigarettes to Tajikistan after Uzbekistan 
had refused to give permission for the transit of Tajikistan-destined 
goods through its territory in March 2010, underscoring the impor-
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tance of Afghanistan’s trading routes as alternatives and back roots 
for Tajikistan.   
 
3. International ports (especially Malaysia)-Bandar Abbas-
Transit Iran-Transit Turkmenistan-Transit Uzbekistan-Denau-
Dushanbe: This route is used largely for cooking oil, Iranian soaps 
and cosmetics, Turkmen cotton cooking oil. 
 
4. Istanbul: Transit Iran-Transit Turkmenistan-Transit Uzbeki-
stan-Denau-Dushanbe: Turkish cooking oil and cosmetics.  
 
5. Uzbekistan-Tajikistan-Khujand-Dushanbe: There is some evi-
dence of Uzbek products moving across this border, although this 
could be more because of particularities of border issues at the time 
of research.  
 
6. Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Tajikistan: Kazakh flour and pasta. 
 
7. Kazakhstan-Kyrghizstan-Tajikistan: Kazakh four and pasta. 
 
8. Urumchi-Dushanbe (Air): Mobile phones, jewellery. 
 
9. Urumchi-Pamir-Khorog-Dushanbe: Tooth brushes. 
 
10. Europe-Ukraine-Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan-Tajikistan: Used cars 
and spare parts, Polish Chrystal sugar.  
 
Both the China routes mentioned above featured very infrequently in 
my interviews with Afghan traders: most remarked that it was not pro-
fitable to bring products across this border because of high Tajik im-
port duties, some commented that Afghans were involved in the 
smuggling of small quantities of Chinese products into Tajikistan 
from Afghanistan. Likewise, traders cannot use the port in Karachi to 
transit goods through Afghanistan as Pakistan does not give permis-
sion to transit goods to Afghanistan that are produced outside Paki-
stan.  
Institutional and other Barriers faced by traders 
Of the formal interviews conducted, questions concerning the prob-
lems faced by Afghan traders working in Afghanistan were the most 
sensitive and difficult for the traders I spoke to. One man commented 
that the government of Tajikistan rules by force making any form of 
trade there difficult, especially for Afghans. Another, however, argued 
that Afghans faced exactly the same problems and opportunities as 
other traders in the country, and that these were created by them brea-
Magnus Marsden 18 
king the law or the general economic conditions as opposed to obsta-
cles placed before traders. Such disagreements suggests the very dif-
ferent types of relationships that the Afghan traders I met have with 
the state and state officials in Tajikistan. The majority of respondents 
who engaged in this issue however either pointed towards or hinted of 
having to constantly negotiate major difficulties as traders.  
 
1. Rent-seeking.  The issue of the rent-seeking of both Afghan and 
Tajik officials came up in all of the interviews, although the speci-
fic nature and degree of this rent-seeking or its relative significance 
in the two different countries was difficult to ascertain. For ex-
ample, one trader estimated that each Kamaz of carrying a load of 
cement from Nizhniy Pyanj to Dushanbe would have to pay to the 
Tajikistan traffic police approximately 150 Somoni ($50), whilst 
another trader involved in the same business said that he could ex-
pect to pay rents of at least $700 on the same route.  
 
There are, of course, significant differences in the ways in which 
individual traders are treated at the border, depending on the rela-
tions they have with border officials. I have attended dinners in 
Kunduz, for example, when border officials have been guests in the 
houses of Afghan traders. One trader, from Afghan Badakshan, 
suggested that there might also be ethnic factors operating in de-
termining how different traders were treated at the border. He clai-
med that he had no problems when bringing his container loads of 
clothes across the border, but that he did know that Pushtun-
speaking Afghans were treated with less fairness, often being made 
to unload their containers, and pay bigger bribes (rishwat).  
 
2. Visas and Official Permissions: Most traders suggested that the 
procurement and extension of Tajikistan work or trading visas was 
not a major problem for them. Some claimed procuring a visa in-
volved the expenditure of very considerable amounts of money (up 
to $1500) in Afghanistan, yet many also said that the extension of 
trade visas in Dushanbe had become far easier and faster over the 
past year, and with the help of a middleman or woman could be 
done in 1 day with an expenditure of $250. The traders were also 
divided in their opinions regarding the issue of the work permit 
(kard-i mehnati) and company license: the former was said to in-
volve an expenditure of about $250 per year, whilst the latter a 
more complex process that involved showing the employment of a 
Tajik worker or partner and also the renting of both office and li-
ving space. More generally, one trader also complained that monies 
were often expended on securing the correct documents to allow 
for the export, import and transportation of goods, especially be-
cause of constantly changing legal requirements, the unavailability 
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of Tajik officers at their desks, and poor information about changes 
in legal requirements for the import and export of goods. 
 
3. Security: All traders who used the Afghanistan route commented 
that security on the road between Kunduz and Kabul had worsened 
over the course of the past year: one man claimed that he had been 
fired at by the Taliban whilst bringing a consignment of clothing.  
Most traders continue to travel between Afghanistan and Tajikistan 
by road, although the launch of a twice weekly flight by Kam Air 
between Dushanbe and Kabul in addition to the pre-existing Ariana 
flight makes travel between the countries safer from the view point 
of some traders: both of these flights were heavily booked when I 
flew in both directions in January 2010. At the same time, impro-
ved air services by Pamir Airlines between Kabul and Kunduz also 
means that traders can bypass the most dangerous part of the over-
land route between Kabul and Tajikistan. None of the cement tra-
ders cited security on the Kunduz road as posing them major prob-
lems: the Taliban did not target them and had caused them no prob-
lems, yet most traders with warehouses in Sher Khan Bandar do 
employ armed security guards at their offices and warehouses.  
 
Concerns for personal safety, however, were of significant impor-
tance for traders from Mazar-i Sharif and Kabul. As noted above, 
one man had decided to close his significant mobile telephone 
business in Mazar-i Sharif having been kidnapped in his home 
town, whilst another trader involved in the transportation of goods 
to Afghan Badakshan had been forced to shift his trading activities 
to Tajikistan because of his brother’s activities in Afghanistan 
 
Finally, as s widely recognised, many traders do not bring goods 
such as cooking oil from Dubai via Karachi and Peshawar to Taji-
kistan both because of restrictions on transit goods through Paki-
stan but also because the conditions of the roads in Pakistan and the 
slow movement of vehicles across the Pakistan/Afghanistan border, 
where goods are also often stolen and destroyed. As a result, most 
traders prefer to bring the goods in sealed transit vehicles through 
Iran, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, even if this means negotiating 
the occasional closure of the Uzbekistan/Tajikistan border. As we 
have seen, this can be circumvented by bringing goods from Turk-
menistan into Afghanistan at Aqinah and then transporting them by 
way of Mazar to Kunduz, again placing traders with access to Af-
ghanistan at an advantage to local traders. Security, however, on 
the road between Mazaar and Aqchah is also said to have deterio-
rated over recent months, making trips by traders to the Aqinah 
border post, often a necessity in Afghanistan given hold-ups of 
goods at borders, potentially more difficult.  
Magnus Marsden 20 
4. Tajikistan’s Current Economic and Political Situation/Border 
closure with Uzbekistan: A particular important issue at the time 
of research in March 2010 was the ongoing border dispute between 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan concerning Tajikistan proposed Hydro-
Electric plant in Roghun. The main border point between the two 
countries at Denau had been closed for several weeks leaving, I 
was told, up to 2000 loaded vehicles stranded there, and leading to 
the degradation of hundreds of tonnes of food items. As a result of 
this, many of the Afghans to whom I spoke had stopped their role 
in the import of goods and had opened retail outlets instead. At the 
same time, all of the traders commented that the buying power of 
Afghans had also been weakened by the building of the Roghun 
power dam and the requirement of Tajik citizens to buy shares in 
this. The closure of the border combined with the general economic 
situation in the country was leading some of the Afghans I spoke to 
reconsider their activities in Tajikistan. One man involved in the 
sale of soaps and detergents told me that the crisis had led him to 
decide that he would leave Tajikistan: he was considering moving 
either to Istanbul or Dubai to continue his trading activities. 
Another trader in flour and oil told me that he had decided to stay 
in the country for another four months, at which point, if things had 
not improved he intended to return to Moscow where he had lived 
as a trader for ten years before coming to Tajikistan.  
 
5. Tajikistan Police: As many of the Afghan traders I interviewed 
had experience of trading in other Central Asian countries, Iran and 
Pakistan they were able to make comparisons regarding their treat-
ment by the state with other contexts. The question of police ha-
rassment was a focus of discussion in several conversations: traders 
with experience in Iran all claimed that they faced less problems 
with the Tajik as compared to Iranian police, although those who 
had worked in Russia (especially Moscow and Rostov where they 
owned soap businesses) claimed the Tajik police were more diffi-
cult to interact with than the Russian police.  In spite of these com-
parisons, however, all the Afghans I spoke to claimed that their 
movement and living conditions were restricted by the complexity 
of their engagement with the Tajik police and that this was the 
most negative feature of their experience of life in the country. 
Most employ relatively expensive middlemen or women to secure 
the registration of their passports with the OVIR, whilst many pre-
ferred to make short trips to the country and stay in relatively ex-
pensive hotels rather than apartments because they felt me secure 
and protected from the police in hotels. One trader also commented 
that if a Tajik partner or debtor failed to repay his debts there was 
little legal help available in the retrieval of debts.  
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6. Consular Assistance: Several of the traders I met commented that 
the Afghan consulate in Dushanbe offered them less assistance than 
they would have liked in terms of the problems they faced with the 
Tajikistan state and in everyday matters such as the renewal of their 
Afghan passports and licenses. More generally, indeed, they refer 
to themselves as being ‘besahib’ (without a master), which imme-
diately puts them at a disadvantage in relationship to traders from 
other countries, especially Iran, the consular officials of which take 
the safety and security of their traders as being a high priority. 
The Possibilities/Policy suggestions 
As the above section suggests, many Afghan traders in Dushanbe to-
day are concerned about their futures in the countries, and few talked 
of future possibilities with much conviction. One trader suggested, 
indeed, that many of the Afghans coming to Tajikistan were defaulters 
looking to escape those in their pursuit and earn a basic livelihood.  
 
Some points for discussion that did emerge, however, included: 
 
1. An improved and wider road to China via the Pamirs that would 
allow Afghan traders to bring Chinese goods to Afghanistan on a 
transit basis. The lack of facility for transit trade and the fact that 
only medium-sized vehicles could move along this road mean that 
at present the Chinese route was not a profitable one. Traders in-
volved in the cement business were happy with the road being built 
with Japanese assistance between the Afghanistan/Tajikistan border 
and Kum Sangir. 
Conclusion 
Profiting from their connections to markets across the world, moments 
of instability within particular Central Asian countries such as Tajiki-
stan, as well as their knowledge of local and international languages, 
trading routes, and commodity chains that have historically formed 
apart of the world they inhabit, Afghans are now a visible and estab-
lished trading minority in Tajikistan, and, likely, elsewhere in Central 
Asia. It is difficult, indeed, to over estimate the importance of Afghan 
traders to supplying the markets of Tajikistan even if their significance 
to trade between Afghanistan and Tajikistan and each of the Central 
Asia states has decreased over the past ten years or so. Equally impor-
tantly, they are also playing an increasingly active role in the produc-
tion of subsistence products include flour and soaps both in this region 
and elsewhere.  
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Afghans are not only central to the import to Tajikistan of subsistence 
food items and basic domestic commodities, they are also playing an 
active and critical role in responding to and themselves forging 
changes in cultural patterns of consumption in the country, as their 
role in the import of clothes and cosmetics from India, Pakistan and 
Iran as well as their significance to the internationalisation of Tajikiis-
tan’s music industry suggests. Both academics and policy makers have 
written a great deal in recent years about the possibilities of greater 
regional coherence between parts of Asia once divided by cold war 
barriers, and the significance of these for the ongoing political insta-
bility of Afghanistan itself. In this paper I hope to have suggested how 
far the experiences and reflections of life on the move in Afghanistan 
and Central Asia by the men whose lives I have brought attention to 
explored will play a critical and perhaps longer lasting role in shaping 
the region’s peoples attempts to address past grievances and forge fu-
ture identity and economic projects than those emanating from inter-
national policy-makers. This, then, is a reason as much as of ‘the eco-
nomy’ to take careful note of their complex and nuanced perceptions 
of life on the move across the Frontiers of South and Central Asia.  
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